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Abstract
A large variety of data mining and machine learning techniques are applied to a wide range of applications today. There-
fore, there is a real need to develop technologies that allows data analysis while preserving the conﬁdentiality of the data.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) protocols allows participants to cooperate on various computations while retaining the
privacy of their own input data, which is an ideal solution to this issue. Although there is a number of frameworks developed
in SMC to meet this challenge, but they are either tailored to perform only on speciﬁc tasks or provide very limited precision.
In this paper, we have developed protocols for ﬂoating point arithmetic based on secure scalar product protocols, which is re-
quired in many real world applications. Our protocols follow most of the IEEE-754 standard, supporting the four fundamental
arithmetic operations, namely addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. We will demonstrate the practicality of these
protocols through performing various statistical calculations that is widely used in most data analysis tasks. Our experiments
show the performance of our framework is both practical and promising.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of KES International.
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1. Introduction
The fast development of today’s web technology has been matched by the rapid growth of data distributed over
the Internet. The performance of joint computation across several distributed databases is needed in a wide array
of applications. As conﬁdentiality of the data of the participants is also a prominent factor and often a vital con-
sideration, secure multi-party computation (SMC) offers a means for participants to cooperate in accomplishing
various computational tasks without compromising their privacy.
Many applications in scientiﬁc or business domain, such as regression and optimization, may require compu-
tation on real numbers of a fairly diverse range. A number of general frameworks for SMC have been proposed[3,
12, 14], but most of which can only perform integer-based computation. Although frameworks based on integers
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can simulate ﬁxed precision rational number computations, the range is limited and the rounding error accumu-
lates rapidly after a large number of operations. Therefore, there is a real need for constructs that can perform
non-integer computations with acceptable precision and performance.
In this paper, we will develop a set of SMC protocols for performing IEEE-754 ﬂoating point arithmetic
operations, by utilizing a set of secure integer computation protocols based on secure scalar product protocols.
Our current implementation assumes two parties, with an neutral third party as a commodity server. Although,
it should be noted that our construct can be generalized to apply to more than two parties. The performance and
practicality of our proposed protocols will be demonstrated through various analysis and measurements in real
network environments, while performing a number of practical computations.
The organization of this paper is composed of six sections. Related works are reviewed in Section 2. And in
Section 3, the data sharing scheme, secure scalar product protocol, the integer protocol suite, and the ﬂoating point
point representation format are introduced. The speciﬁcations and implementation of the ﬂoating point arithmetic
protocols, along with an analysis of their complexity are given in Section 4. Section 5 will demonstrate the
practicality and performance of our protocols in the various experiments. Finally, we will give a brief conclusion
and point out directions for future work in Section 6.
2. Related Works
First introduced by Yao[21] and extended by Goldreich et al.[11], there has been an on-going development in
the ﬁeld of multi-party secure computation. Among various constructs, integer-based secure scalar products has
been found to be very practical in real applications.
Many constructs for multi-party secure computation based on secure scalar product has been proposed over
the years, among which the performance of secure scalar product protocols based on the commodity model has
been demonstrated to be extraordinarily efﬁcient[19].
The theoretical aspects of the secure scalar product protocols have also been extensively investigated. A
privacy measurement based on information theory proposed by Chiang et al.[5], proved that the invertible-matrix
approach leaks at least half of the private information, whereas the commodity-based approach is perfectly secure.
Wang et al. [17] have proven that no information-theoretically secure two-party protocol exists for scalar products
without the use of a third party server, and Shen et al.[16] conducted an exploratory veriﬁcation of the closure
property of the commodity-based approach.
Whereas secure multi-party computation protocols are traditionally developed for integer computations, recent
research developments have extended the horizon of SMC protocols to non-integer values. Protocols by Fouque
et al.[7] handles computation of rational numbers. Catrina et al. [4] proposed protocols for real value computation
using ﬁxed point representation, while the protocols developed by Deiseroth et al. [8] are based on logarithmic
representation. A set of protocols, based on homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits, for single precision
ﬂoating point representation is proposed by Franz et al.[9], but only the speciﬁcation of the construct are given,
and no experiment were conducted. Recently, Aliasgari et al. [2] proposed another set of protocols for single
precision ﬂoating point computation, based on a modiﬁcation of ﬁxed point number protocols.
However, according to the error estimations method in [13], it is easy to estimate the relative error of single
precision ﬂoating point numbers in certain applications. For example, the relative error of the computation of the
mean of 1000 single precision ﬂoating point numbers can reach as high as around 10−4. Therefore, there is a real
need for protocols that can achieve higher precisions, such as double precision ﬂoating point numbers.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the secret sharing scheme that our protocols are based on, and give a brief
description of the secure scalar product protocol. The next subsection will be an introduction to the integer
computation protocol suite, which will serve as the building block of our ﬂoating point based protocols. After
this, we detail the speciﬁcation of the ﬂoating point number format supported by our protocols, and ﬁnally the
speciﬁcation of a sharing scheme for ﬂoating point numbers by using three integers.
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3.1. Additive Secret Sharing Scheme
Our protocols are based on additive secret sharing over ZN , that is a secret value x is split into n shares
x1, x2, ..., xn ∈ ZN to n parties, such that x = ∑ni=1 xi, and any n−1 subset {xi1 , ..., xin−1 } is uniformly distributed. The
original secret can only be recovered, if and only if all the shares are combined together. Suppose [a], [b] denote
two values that are additively shared and c is a public constant. Since additive secret sharing is also a linear secret
sharing scheme, addition [a] + [b] and constant multiplication c[a] can be performed by each party locally.
In this paper we mainly consider two party secure computation. Therefore, a secret value x ∈ ZN is distributed
in to two shares x1, x2 ∈ ZN , such that x = (x1 + x2) mod N, where x1 is privately held by one party, and x2 is
privately held by the other.
3.2. Scalar Product Protocols
For two-party secure computation, suppose the two parties hold private inputs X1 and X2, respectively. After
the execution of some protocol, they hold private outputs Y1 and Y2. The subscript of a variable denotes the party
which owns the variable. We use (X1, X2){plist} → (Y1,Y2) to specify the corresponding protocols, where plist is
a list of public variables. The formulation for the scalar product protocol follow’s Goldreich’s principle[10].
Speciﬁcation 1 (Scalar-Product). Party 1 holds a private vector (x[1]1, . . . , x[d]1) and Party 2 hold a private
vector (x[1]2, . . . , x[d]2), where x[i] j denotes the ith element of Party j’s private vector. Both parties want to
collaboratively execute the secure protocol
((x[1]1, . . . , x[d]1), (x[1]2, . . . , x[d]2)) → (y1, y2)
such that y1 + y2 = (
∑d
i=1 x[i]1 · x[i]2) mod N, where y j is held by Party j, and that x[i]1, x[i]2, y1, y2 ∈ ZN, for each
i = 1, . . . , d.
It can be observed from the speciﬁcation that the output of the scalar product protocols are the additive sharing
of the scalar product of the two private vectors held by the two parties.
The speciﬁc secure scalar product protocol construct we have adopted for our implementation is the commodity-
based approach [6]. Although a third neutral party is needed for two party computation, this approach has extraor-
dinarily efﬁcient performance compared to several other constructs of secure scalar product protocols [19]. The
protocol has been proven to be information theoretically secure against semi-honest adversaries [5][17].
3.3. The Integer Computation Protocol Suite
Since the input and output of secure scalar protocols are both additively shared, the outputs of previous pro-
tocols can be inputs to the next secure scalar product protocol. Therefore, it is possible to implement a protocol
π composed of scalar product protocols. Since the input and output of each composing secure scalar product
protocol, which are actually the intermediate results of π, are all additively shared, hence no intermediate results
are revealed.
An integer computation protocol suite, developed by using the scalar product protocol as building blocks, is
capable of performing various commonly-used operations [15][18]. A brief description of the speciﬁc protocols
that are used in implementing the ﬂoating point protocols is given in Table 1.
It should be noted that the protocols in the integer computation protocol suite and the proposed ﬂoating-point
protocols can be constructed from any scalar product protocol construct that follows speciﬁcation 1, and can be
easily extended to multi-party settings by decomposing various computations into pairwise-tasks between parties.
3.4. Our Floating Point Number Format
A ﬂoating point number consists of three parts, namely the sign bit, the exponent, and the mantissa. Let s,
e, and m, denote the length of the sign bit, the exponent ﬁeld and the mantissa ﬁeld in bits, respectively, and let
S = 2s , E = 2e , M = 2m . Hence the domains are ZS , ZE , and ZM , respectively. The bias of the exponent is
deﬁned as bias = (2e−1) − 1.
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The Integer Computation Protocols
Domain Protocol Description of output (w1 + w2)
ZN Z2-to-Zn(xi,ZN ) transform (x1+x2) from a string with elements shared inZ2 to an integer
in ZN
Z2 Zn-to-Z2(xi,ZN ) transform (x1 + x2) from an integer in ZN to a string with elements
shared in Z2
ZN Addition(xi,yi) returns (x1 + x2) + (y1 + y2)
ZN Product(xi,yi) returns (x1 + x2) · (y1 + y2)
ZN If-Then-Else(di, xi, yi) if (d1 + d2) = 1 then return (x1 + x2) else return (y1 + y2)
ZN Comparison(xi) if (x1 + x2) < 0 then return 1 else return 0
ZN Equal-Zero(xi) if (x1 + x2) = 0 then return 1 else return 0
ZN Shift-Right(xi, ni) returns (x1 + x2) shifted (n1 + n2) digits to the right
ZN Shift-Left(xi,ni) returns (x1 + x2) shifted (n1 + n2) digits to the left
Z2 Or(xi, yi) returns ((x1 + x2) OR (y1 + y2))
Z2 And(xi, yi) returns ((x1 + x2) AND (y1 + y2))
Z2 Not(xi) returns (NOT((x1 + x2)))
Table 1: The integer protocols that are used in the ﬂoating point protocols. The integers xi, yi, di, and wi are held
by each party, where i = 1 denotes the integer is held by Party 1 and i = 2 denotes the integer held by Party 2 .
A widely used ﬂoating point number format is the IEEE-754 standard[1], which for single precision s =
1, e = 8, m = 24, with bias = 127 and for double precision s = 1, e = 11, m = 53, with bias = 1023.
The mantissa in the standard is a ﬁxed-point number, where the integer part is assumed to be a hidden-bit. Since
the arithmetic rules for integer and ﬁxed-point numbers are essentially the same, the difference only lies in the
interpretation of the number, and as such we can loosely consider them interchangeable with integers.
The ﬂoating point number format that our protocol supports mostly follow the double precision of the IEEE-
754 standard with the following minor exceptions:
• For ease of implementation, the hidden-bit in the IEEE-754 standard is made explicit and an extra bit is
extended, thus making the integer part of the mantissa be represented by two bits. Hence the mantissa ﬁeld
length in our implementation is m = 55.
• Apart from the value zero, all other special values, such as “Not a number”(NaN), and exception handling,
such as division by zero, are not supported, since if supported, they might entail some information leakage
during the computation. When these conditions are encountered, the protocols compute as normal, but may
produce erroneous results.
• The only rounding mode supported is truncation, while IEEE-754 also deﬁnes round to zero, round to ±∞,
and round-to-nearest.
3.5. Componentwise Additive Sharing of Floating Point Numbers
In subsequent discussions, the symbols “+ f p”, “− f p”, “× f p”, and “÷ f p” denotes the normal ﬂoating point
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, respectively.
The most natural way do deﬁne the additive secret sharing of a ﬂoating point number f is by f = f1 + f p f2,
where ﬂoating point numbers f1 and f2 are privately and separately held by the two parties. Since f1 and f2 a
both uniformly distributed, the original secret f cannot only be recovered by combining both shares, which is
comparable to that of integer additive secret sharing.
A ﬂoating point number f can also be represented as a 3-tuple of integers (s f , e f ,mf ), where s f is the sign, e f
is the exponent, and mf is the mantissa. Hence, sharing a ﬂoating point number can be viewed as the sharing of
these three integers.
Deﬁnition 3.1. For a pair of 3-tuple of integers t1 = (st1 , et1 ,mt1 ), t2 = (st2 , et2 ,mt2 ), where sti ∈ ZS , eti ∈ ZE, and
mti ∈ ZM , i = 1, 2. The operation ⊕ is deﬁned by
t1 ⊕ t2 = ((st1 + st2 ) mod S , (et1 + et2 ) mod E, (mt1 + mt2 ) mod M).
Therefore, component-wise sharing of a ﬂoating point number f between two parties is deﬁned by f =
(s f , e f ,mf ) = t1 ⊕ t2, where t1 is held by one party and t2 is held by the other. Since each integer of the 3-
tuple are additively shared, no information can be obtained one of them unless all shares are combined. Hence,
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the component-wise shared ﬂoating point number f can only be recovered if and only if all shares are combined
together.
Although additive sharing can also use a 3-tuple of integers in representing shared ﬂoating point numbers,
they are incompatible with componentwise additive sharing, since the former combines the shared number by
applying the normal ﬂoating point addition + f p, and the latter combines them by the deﬁned operation ⊕. Since
the operation ⊕ is more simpler than normal ﬂoating point addition + f p, which requires a series of operations such
as alignment and normalization, componentwise additive sharing is less complex than additive sharing. Therefore,
the input and output of our ﬂoating point protocols are all assumed to be in a componentwise additive sharing
scheme.
4. The Floating Point Arithmetic Protocols
We introduce the ﬂoating point arithmetic protocols in this section. We also give the conversion method for
additive sharing to componentwise additive sharing of a ﬂoating point number.
4.1. Preliminaries
The four basic arithmetic operations for ﬂoating point numbers are addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
division. The inputs of each protocol are a pair of ﬂoating point numbers fi = ( fi.s, fi.e, fi.m), where i = 1, 2, fi.s
is the sign bit, fi.e is the exponent, fi.m is the mantissa, and each is componentwise additive shared between the
two parties. The output of each protocol is a ﬂoating point number, which is also componentwise additive shared.
Constituent of the Protocols
Protocol Domain Constituent Times
Product
ZM2 Z2-to-Zn(m) 2
ZM Zn-to-Z2 2
ZM2 Product 1
ZM2 Zn-to-Z2 1
ZM Z2-to-Zn 2
ZM If-Then-Else 1
ZE If-Then-Else 1
Division
Z2 Z2-to-Zn 2
ZM2 Zn-to-Z2(2m − 2) 1
ZM2 Zn-to-Z2(m) 1
ZM2 Comparison m − 1
ZM2 If-Then-Else m − 1
ZM Z2-to-Zn(m − 2) 2
ZM If-Then-Else 1
ZE If-Then-Else 1
Addition
ZE Zn-to-Z2 2
ZM Z2-to-Zn(e) 2
ZM Comparison 4
Subtraction ZM Shift Right 3
ZM If-Then-Else m + 5
ZM Zn-to-Z2 1
Z2 Product m
ZE If-Then-Else 4
ZM Shift Left 1
Table 2: The constituents of the ﬂoating point protocol.
Complexity of the Protocols
Protocol Domain Dimension Times
Product
ZM2 m 2
Z2 3 4m − 3
ZM2 2 1
ZM m − 2 2
ZM 1 1
ZM 2 1
ZE 1 1
ZE 2 1
Division
Z2 3 22m − m − 1
Z2 3 2e + 15m − 17
ZM e 2
ZM 1 5m + 5
ZM 2 13m + 9
ZM m 6
Z2 2 m
ZE 1 4
ZE 2 4
Addition
ZM2 m 1
ZM2 2m − 2 1
ZM2 1 2m − 1
Subtraction ZM2 2 m − 1
ZM2 m − 2 2
ZM 1 1
ZM 2 1
ZE 1 1
ZE 2 1
Table 3: The complexity of the ﬂoating point protocol.
The complexity of the protocols are measured in the
numbers of scalar product protocols executed.
The implementation of the protocols adopts the following convention and policy:
• Any kind of event that may trigger an exception, such as an overﬂow, are not handled, since we do not
support any exception handling for reasons mentioned previously. The protocols continue to compute as
normal but may produce erroneous results when such events occur.
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• When a number x is converted to a bitwise-shared binary string strx with length k by the Zn-to-Z2 protocol,
the most signiﬁcant bit is at strx[k − 1], and the least signiﬁcant bit is at strx[0].
The speciﬁcation of the ﬂoating point arithmetic protocols are as follows:
Speciﬁcation 2 (Floating Point Arithmetic Protocols). Party 1 and Party 2 componentwise additively shared two
ﬂoating point numbers f1 = x1 ⊕ x2 and f2 = y1 ⊕ y2, where x1 and y1 are held by Party 1 , x2 and y2 are held
by Party 2 . The operation f1 ◦ f2 is performed by executing the protocol ((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) → (z1, z2), where z1,
z2 are held by Party 1 and Party 2 , respectively, such that z1 ⊕ z2 = (x1 ⊕ x2) ◦ (y1 ⊕ y2), and , for operator
◦ ∈ {+ f p,− f p,× f p,÷ f p} .
We will now provide the implementation details in the following subsections. The constituent and complexity
of the ﬂoating point arithmetic protocols are provided in Table 4.1.
4.2. The Addition and Subtraction Protocol
The implementation of the addition and subtraction protocol is essentially divided into four stages. From line
5 to line 9, an alignment of the mantissa is ﬁrst performed. The addition or subtraction of the mantissa is then
performed from line 12 to line 14. The sign bit, a preliminary mantissa, and a preliminary exponent are determined
on line 17, 18 and 19. Since the preliminary mantissa and exponent may not be normalized, a postnormalization
is performed from line 22 to line 38. The preliminary mantissa morigin is ﬁrst transformed to bitwise-shared binary
string strm to compute the value of the two ﬂags le f tshi f t and rightshi f t, indicates whether a left or right shift
operation for morigin to be normalized. Subtraction is performed by simply inverting the sign bit of the desired
subtrahend. The details of the addition protocol are described in Algorithm 1.
4.3. The Multiplication Protocol and the Division Protocol
The multiplication protocol ﬁrst determines the sign bit and a preliminary exponent on line 5 and line 8,
respectively. An expanding the mantissas to larger domain is performed on line 11 and line 12, and the resulting
product of the two expanded mantissas is stored in morigin on line 13. A postnormalization is performed from line
16 to line 19, and the msb used to determine if a shift operation is needed for the preliminary mantissa morigin to
be normalized. The details of the addition protocol are described in Algorithm 3.
The division protocol is very similar to that of the multiplication, consisting of determining sign and exponent
value on line 5 and line 23, the expansion of the mantissas to larger domain from line 8 to 12, and postnormal-
ization from line 26 to 28. The difference is that instead of performing multiplication, a division operation is
performed on the mantissas from line 15 to line 21 by long division. Detailed description of the implementation
of the division protocol is given in Algorithm 2.
4.4. Conversion of Data Sharing Formats
Since the input and output of our protocols are all in the componentwise additive sharing scheme and the
initial data are assumed to be in the additive sharing scheme, a conversion that transforms additive sharing to
componentwise additive sharing is needed for every private input before any computation can take place. The
conversion is essentially to ﬁnd a pair of 3-tuple integers s1 and s2, such that f = f1 + f p f2 = s1 ⊕ s2, where fi and
si are held by Party i.
The ﬂoating point number zero is 0 = (0, 0, 0) in both sharing formats. Hence for any ﬂoating point number
f , the relation f = f + f p 0 = f ⊕ 0 holds. Therefore, by performing a single ﬂoating point addition protocol
add f p(( f1, 0), (0, f2)) → (s1, s2), which is effectively f = f1+ f p f2 = ( f1+ f p0)+ f p (0+ f p f2) = ( f1⊕0)+ f p (0⊕ f2) =
s1 ⊕ s2, the desired conversion is achieved.
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Algorithm 1 Floating Point Addition Protocol
1: Input: f1 = ( f1.s, f1.e, f1.m), f2 = ( f2.s, f2.e, f2.m)
2: Output: f = (sign, exponent,mantissa)
3:
4: /* Align mantissa */
5: e1 ← Z2-to-Zn(Zn-to-Z2( f1.e,ZE), ZM)
6: e2 ← Z2-to-Zn(Zn-to-Z2( f2.e,ZE), ZM)
7: d ← Comparison(e1 − e2)
8: m1 ← If-Then-Else(d, Shift-Right( f1.m, (e2 − e1)),
f1.m)
9: m2 ← If-Then-Else(d, f2.m, Shift-Right( f2.m, (e1 −
e2)))
10:
11: /* Add sign and perform addition on mantissa */
12: m1 ← If-Then-Else( f1.s,−m1,m1)
13: m2 ← If-Then-Else( f2.s,−m2,m2)
14: morigin ← m1 + m2
15:
16: /* Determine sign bit and decide a preliminary man-
tissa and exponent */
17: sign← Comparison(morign)
18: morigin ← If-Then-Else(sign,−morigin,morigin)
19: eorigin ← If-Then-Else(d, f2.e, f1.e)
20:
21: /* Postnormalization */
22: strm[ ]← Zn-to-Z2(morigin, ZM)
23:
24: elshi f t ← eorigin
25: le f tshi f t ← Not(Or(strm[m − 1], strm[m − 2]))
26: le f tshi f t ← And(le f tshi f t, Not(Equal-Zero(morigin)))
27: dis← 0, l f ← Not(le f tshi f t)
28: for i← (m − 2)→ 0 do
29: l f ← Addition(l f , strm[i]) - Product(l f , strm[i])
30: dis← If-Then-Else(l f , dis, Addition(dis,ONE))
31: end for
32: elshi f t ← If-Then-Else(le f tshi f t, (elshi f t − dis), elshi f t)
33: mlshi f t ← Shift-Left(morigin, dis)
34:
35: rightshi f t ← strm[m − 1]
36: mrshi f t ← Shift-Right(morigin, ONE)
37: mrshi f t ← If-Then-Else(rightshi f t, mrshi f t, morigin)
38: ershi f t ← If-Then-Else(rightshi f t, Addition(eorigin,
ONE), eorigin)
39:
40: mantissa← If-Then-Else(rightshi f t, mrshi f t, mlshi f t)
41: exponent ← If-Then-Else(rightshi f t, ershi f t, elshi f t)
42:
43: return (sign, exponent,mantissa)
Algorithm 2 Floating Point Division Protocol
1: Input: f1 = ( f1.s, f1.e, f1.m), f1 = ( f2.s, f2.e, f2.m)
2: Output: f = (sign, exponent,mantissa)
3:
4: /* Determine the sign bit */
5: sign← Or( f1.s, f2.s)
6:
7: /* Expand the domain of the mantissas */
8: zero string[ ]← [0, 0 · · · 0] /* the length is 24 */
9: strm1 [ ]← Zn-to-Z2( f1.m, ZM)
10: str[ ]← Concatinate array(zero string[ ], strm1 [ ])
11: m1 ← Z2-to-Zn(str[ ], ZM2 )
12: m2 ← Z2-to-Zn(Zn-to-Z2( f2.m, ZM), ZM2 )
13:
14: /* Perform Division */
15: q array[ ]← [ ] /* an empty array */
16: for i← (m − 2) to 0 do
17: t ← m1 − (m2 · 2i)
18: bit ← Comparison(t)
19: q array[i]← Addition(bit,ONE)
20: m1 ← If-Then-Else(bit, m1, t)
21: end for
22:
23: eorigin ← Addition( f1.e − f2.e, BIAS)
24:
25: /* Postnormalization */
26: msb← q array[m − 2]
27: mshi f t ← Z2-to-Zn(q array[(m − 1) · · · 1], ZM)
28: morigin ← Z2-to-Zn(q array[(m − 2) · · · 0], ZM)
29:
30: mantissa← If-Then-Else(msb, mshi f t, morigin)
31: exponent ← If-Then-Else(msb, eorigin, Addition(eorigin,
−ONE))
32:
33: return (sign, exponent,mantissa)
Algorithm 3 Floating Point Multiplication Protocol
1: Input: f1 = ( f1.s, f1.e, f1.m), f1 = ( f2.s, f2.e, f2.m)
2: Output: f = (sign, exponent,mantissa)
3:
4: /*Determine the sign bit*/
5: sign← Or( f1.s, f2.s)
6:
7: /*Determine a preliminary exponent*/
8: eorigin ← Addition(( f1.e + f2.e), −BIAS)
9:
10: /*Expand mantissas’ domain and perform multiplica-
tion*/
11: m1 ← Z2-to-Zn(Zn-to-Z2( f1.m,ZM), ZM2 )
12: m2 ← Z2-to-Zn(Zn-to-Z2( f2.m,ZM), ZM2 )
13: morigin ← Product(m1,m2)
14:
15: /* Postnormalization */
16: m array[ ]←Zn-to-Z2(morigin, ZM2 )
17: msb← m array[2m − 1]
18: mshi f t ← Z2-to-Zn(m array[(2m − 1) · · · (m + 1)], ZM)
19: morigin ← Z2-to-Zn(m array[(2m − 2) · · · (m − 1)], ZM)
20:
21: mantissa← If-Then-Else(msb, mshi f t, morigin)
22: exponent ← If-Then-Else(msb, Addition(eorigin,ONE),
eorigin)
23:
24: return (sign, exponent,mantissa)
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5. Experimental Results
The commodity-based approach is adopted for the secure scalar product protocol implementation as mentioned
in section 3.2. All of the protocols and related programs are implemented in Ruby (version 1.9.1 p378). The
commodity server ran on a 2.93GHz FreeBSD machine. Party 1 ran on a 3.04GHz FreeBSD, and Party 2 ran on a
3.0GHz Linux machine. All machines have DDR2 800 memory.
5.1. Individual Protocol Performance
In the experiments, we compute the average execution time and the average relative error of each implemented
protocol. The ﬂoating point operands are generated by a Ruby implemented random number generator within the
range of 0 to 1, 000, 000. The generated data are additively shared. The relative error is a comparison of the output
value of the protocols and the resulting value of the same operands with the same operation in Ruby, which is also
in double precision. The performance is evaluated by the execution time of each protocol for each client. Each
reported performance result is the average execution time of 100 executions and they are shown in the Party 1
and Party 2 columns of Table 4. For comparison, we also conducted performance measurements with the same
framework, but as all three parties are executed locally on a single machine, any external network inﬂuence is
avoided. The machine is the machine that ran the “commodity server”. The results are shown in the Party 1 OPC
and Party 2 OPC columns of Table 4.
Protocol Party 1 Party 2 Party 1 OPC. Party 2 OPC. Relative error
Add./Sub. 2.5441 2.5445 0.8006 0.8007 1.17965 × 10−16
Product 0.9560 0.9564 0.090646 0.090433 2.05098 × 10−16
Division 4.5889 4.5894 2.42991 2.429692 7.47230 × 10−17
Table 4: Individual protocol performance measured in seconds. The second and third columns, the protocols are
executed in a real network setting, while the fourth and ﬁfth columns are executed locally on a single machine.
It can be seen that our execution time is practical and conﬁrms our complexity analysis. The relative error may
be caused by truncation, since the rounding mode of most ﬂoating point implementations are round-to-the-nearest,
which is on average smaller than that of truncation[13], but it can be observed that the errors are reasonably small.
It is clear that the product protocol has the best performance. Although the product protocol has a similar
complexity with the addition protocol in terms of the number of scalar products performed, as displayed in Table
3, the dimension and the domain of the vectors involved in the addition protocol are larger, and this will result
in penalties on performance. The division protocol has the poorest performance, since the computation of the
mantissa is costly.
5.2. Application of Floating Point Arithmetic Protocols
We now present a few applications of our ﬂoating point arithmetic protocols by performing various common
statistic computation.
5.2.1. Computing Mean and Variance.
We ﬁrst perform the computation of mean and variance. The computation is performed on a set of 100 ﬂoating
point numbers, generated by a Ruby implemented random number generator within the range of 0 to 1, 000, 000,
and under componentwise additive sharing. The ﬁnal results are compared to the value computed by one party
computation, namely when a party performs the computation all by itself, which is also implemented in Ruby.
Mean Variance
Party 1 194.5968 sec. 194.5816 sec.
Party 2 610.5248 sec. 610.4716 sec.
Relative Error 4.60051 × 10−15 3.77015 × 10−15
Table 5: The results of the calculation of statistical values. The second column of the two regression experiments
are the resulting coefﬁcients of the Ruby implementation, while the third column are by the protocols.
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Simple Linear Regression
coeff. Ruby OPC MPC
α 29.917436789508 29.9174367890303
β 0.541747011438181 0.541747011445812
MSE 5.128696287 5.12869629
Multivariate Regression
Heights and weights for American women
coeff. Ruby OPC MPC
β1 128.875848538853 128.875848538469
β2 −143.245136869685 −143.245136869977
β3 61.9876613958928 61.9876613954777
Randomly generated data set
coeff. Ruby OPC MPC
β1 0.387944654584357 0.387944654584364
β2 0.355174454658603 0.355174454658616
β3 0.350174271933872 0.350174271933895
β4 0.348354902835034 0.348354902835044
β5 0.344983551087036 0.344983551087051
Table 6: The results of the calculation of statistical values. The second column of the two regression experiments
are the resulting coefﬁcients of the Ruby implementation, while the third column are by the protocols.
The results are shown in Table 5. The table shows the execution time that is needed for both Party 1 and
Party 2 to compute the mean and variance. It shows that our protocol performs reasonably well with low relative
error.
5.2.2. Simple Linear Regression.
Next we give an implementation of a simple linear regression algorithm, which has many real-life applications
[20]. We adopt the least square method for regression. Our regression model is y = α + βx, and that αˆ, βˆ are
determined by αˆ = y¯ − βˆx¯, βˆ = (n∑ xi −∑ xiyi)/(n∑ x2i − (
∑
xi)2).
The data set for this experiment is 1373 sets of the heights of mothers in the UK under the age of 65 and one
of their adult daughters over the age of 18 in the period of 1893-1898 collected by E.S. Pearson [20]. It is assumed
that the computation is carried out under homogeneous sharing, and the distribution of the data sets among Party 1
and Party 2 is arbitrary since this setting is most commonly seen in practical settings. For this experiment Party 1
has 544 sets and Party 2 has 829 sets.
The results are shown in the ﬁrst part of Table 6. The resulting parameters computed by the protocols are
shown in the MPC column. For comparison, we also implement a simple linear regression program in Ruby with
the same method and approach and applied it on to the same data set, and with the results in Ruby OPC column.
Also, the MSE of each model are given on the third row. It can be observed that there are only minor differences
with the model that is generated with the Ruby implementation, and it may also be caused by rounding errors.
5.2.3. Multivariate Linear Regression.
To further demonstrate the capability of our ﬂoating point protocols, we perform a more complex task of doing
multivariate linear regression on two data sets [20]. We used the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, which is
essentially the calculation of the coefﬁcient matrix by βˆ = (XTX)−1XTy.
Computations are carried out on two data sets. The data are homogeneous shared, with the distribution of
the data sets among Party 1 and Party 2 being arbitrary. One of which is ﬁtting 15 sets of heights and weights
for American women aged 30 to 39 from The World Almanac and Book of Facts (1975) to the model wi =
β1+β2hi+β3h2i +i, where β1, β2, and β3 are the coefﬁcients. For this experiment Party 1 has 7 sets and Party 2 has
8 sets. The other is ﬁtting 1000 sets of randomly generated numbers, generated by a Ruby implemented random
generator, within the range of 0 to 1, 000, 000 to the model wi = β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4, where β1, β2, β3, and
β4 are the coefﬁcients. Party 1 has 280 sets and Party 2 has 720 sets in this experiment.
The coefﬁcients of the models are shown in Table 6. The resulting parameters computed by the protocols are
shown in the MPC column. A program implemented in Ruby with the same method and approach is also applied
to the same data set for comparison with the SMC results, and its results are shown in the Ruby OPC column.
It can be readily observed that apart from a small difference that may have been caused by truncation, there is
no signiﬁcant difference between the result of the two computations.
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6. Conclusion
We have developed a set of ﬂoating point arithmetic protocols by utilizing secure scalar product protocols. The
protocols can be used to construct secure data analysis applications across distributed databases, while preserving
the privacy and integrity of the data. The design of the protocols allows the user to deﬁne their own ﬂoating point
format, and strike their own balance between precision and performance.
The speciﬁc implementation of our protocols follows the double-precision ﬂoating point format in the IEEE-
754 standard, which allows it to be utilized in a straight-forward fashion in the implementation of secure data
analysis applications. The practicality of our protocols is demonstrated by performing the most common statistical
calculations such as mean, variance, and linear regression. The results shows that the applications constructed by
our protocols can achieve low relative errors, and displays promising potentials for constructing more complex
applications for data mining and analysis.
We are currently constructing more frequently used protocols for data analysis, such as exponentiation and
logarithms, based on our ﬂoating point protocols. Also we are in the process of enhancing the performance and
extending the precision of our protocols. We believe that our ﬂoating point protocol suite will be a promising
solution to striking the balance between data availability and privacy.
References
[1] IEEE Standard for Floating-Point Arithmetic. Technical report, Microprocessor Standards Committee of the IEEE Computer Society,
August 2008.
[2] Mehrdad Aliasgari, Marina Blanton, Yihua Zhang, and Aaron Steele. Secure computation on ﬂoating point numbers. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2012/405, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[3] Dan Bogdanov, Sven Laur, and Jan Willemson. Sharemind: A framework for fast privacy-preserving computations. In Sushil Jajodia
and Javier Lopez, editors, Computer Security - ESORICS 2008, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2008.
[4] Octavian Catrina and Amitabh Saxena. Secure computation with ﬁxed-point numbers. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security,
volume 6052 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 35–50. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010.
[5] Yi-Ting Chiang, Da-WeiWang, Churn-Jung Liau, and Tsan-Sheng Hsu. Secrecy of two-party secure computation. Data and Applications
Security XIX, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 3654:114–123, 2005.
[6] Wenliang Du and Zhijun Zhan. A practical approach to solve secure multi-party computation problems. In NSPW ’02: Proceedings of
the 2002 Workshop on New Security Paradigms, pages 127–135, New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM Press.
[7] Pierre-Alain Fouque, Jacques Stern, and Geert-Jan Wackers. Cryptocomputing with rationals. In Proceedings of the 6th international
conference on Financial cryptography, FC’02, pages 136–146, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003. Springer-Verlag.
[8] M. Franz, B. Deiseroth, K. Hamacher, S. Jha, S. Katzenbeisser, and H. Schro¨der. Secure computations on non-integer values. In
Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2010 IEEE International Workshop on, pages 1 –6, dec. 2010.
[9] Martin Franz and Stefan Katzenbeisser. Processing encrypted ﬂoating point signals. In Proceedings of the thirteenth ACM multimedia
workshop on Multimedia and security, pages 103–108. ACM, 2011.
[10] Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography, Volume II Basic Applications. Cambridge University Press, 1st edition, 2004.
[11] Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson. How to play any mental game. In STOC ’87: Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 218–229, New York, NY, USA, 1987. ACM Press.
[12] Wilko Henecka, Stefan K o¨gl, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Thomas Schneider, and Immo Wehrenberg. Tasty: tool for automating secure two-
party computations. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, CCS ’10, pages 451–462,
2010.
[13] Israel Koren. Computer Arithmetic Algorithms. AK Peters/CRC Press, 2nd edition edition, 2001.
[14] Dahlia Malkhi, Noam Nisan, Benny Pinkas, and Yaron Sella. Fairplay — a secure two-party computation system. In USENIX Security
’04: Proceedings of the 13th Symposium on Security, Usenix, pages 287–302, 2004.
[15] Chih-Hao Shen, Justin Zhan, Tsan-Sheng Hsu, Churn-Jung Liau, and Da-WeiWang. Scalar-product based secure two-party computation.
In GrC ’08: IEEE International Conference on Granular Computing, pages 556–561, Aug. 2008.
[16] Chih-Hao Shen, Justin Zhan, Da-Wei Wang, Tsan-Sheng Hsu, and Churn-JungLiau. Information-theoretically secure number-product
protocol. In ICMLC ’07: International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics, volume 5, pages 3006–3011, 19-22 Aug.
2007.
[17] Da-WeiWang, Churn-Jung Liau, Yi-Ting Chiang, and Tsan-Sheng Hsu. Information theoretical analysis of two-party secret computation.
Data and Applications Security XX, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4127:310–317, 2006.
[18] I-Cheng Wang, Kung Chen, Tsan-Sheng Hsu, Churn-Jung Liau, Chih-Hao Shen, and Da-Wei Wang. Protocols for secure multi-party
computation: Design, implementation and performance evaluation. Technical Report, 2010.
[19] I-Cheng Wang, Chih-Hao Shen, Tsan-Sheng Hsu, Churn-Chung Liau, Da-Wei Wang, and Justin Zhan. Towards empirical aspects of
secure scalar product. In ISA ’08: IEEE International Conference on Information Security and Assurance, pages 573–578, April 2008.
[20] Sanford Weisberg. Applied Linear Regression. Wiley, 3rd edition edition, 2005.
[21] Andrew C. Yao. Protocols for secure computation. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, pages 160–164, November 1982.
